Name: FoxReplay Workstation Protection

Text: Intercepted internet traffic in
a classified environment

FoxReplay
Workstation
Protection
Analysis of intercepted IP traffic in a classified
environment brings along specific challenges.
Without proper security measures, intercepted
malicious content may manifest itself in the
classified analysis network. This concerns
viruses, worms, adware but also malicious
code specifically designed by third parties
(e.g. certain tapped entities) to disrupt
interception capabilities.
This document describes several options to
ensure that potentially insecure and malicious
content can be analysed in a classified
environment.

Prerequisites

Sandboxing

The following prerequisites apply to the several options to handle insecure

Virtualisation techniques and sandboxes making the reconstructed data

and malicious content described in this document:

available to analysts is a good security measure that assures that if virus



Data can be active and passive. Passive data is stored and cannot

protection fails, infections do not spread to other systems and are limited

perform actions or have actions performed. Active data may – with or

to the virtual environment. In combination with remote desktop con-

without user intervention (“clicking”) – lead to execution of instruc-

nections, this ensures the workstations used by the analysts remain free

tions on a computer.

from any (malicious) active content and any infected system can easily be



Intercepted traffic in packets is passive.

“refreshed”.



Reconstructed traffic by FoxReplay Analyst may become activated.

Please note that these safe environments sometimes can be detected by



Word documents, email messages, web pages, Excel spreadsheets,

the hostile code and acted upon i.e. defending itself from being analysed,

chat conversations etc. are all active data.

destroying the guest operating system prior to allowing the tracing of the

A just viewed and handled graphical representation is not active any

program, etc.



more.


Active data can be transformed, using the right techniques, into pas-

Diverse operating systems and applications

sive (visual) documents (e.g. in PDF format or screen dumps).

Using different operating systems may limit the impact of malicious code
in a network environment as it may not be effective on all hosts. In some

Protection Controls

cases this includes the application layer as well. Where a hostile exploit
usually focuses on one particular (version of an) operating system or ap-

Virus Scanner

plication, it leaves systems running other software (versions) unharmed.

The most elementary security measure that is able to protect against most

Although it may seem a trivial measure, this may ensure continuous availa-

public viruses, worms and other forms of malicious content is the imple-

bility of the environment in case virus protection software fails.

mentation of virus scanners. However, application of virus scanners alone
does not always offer the right level of protection.

Network segmentation and isolation

Virus scanners should be applied at the client level and only if required at

To prevent further spreading of malicious code, strict network segmen-

the server level. The former allows for protection against malicious content

tation and host isolation is essential. Communications with other systems

that is “run” on the analysts’ workstations, e.g. local exploits, macro code

should be limited to the bare essential protocols. Firewalls, data diodes

in MS Office documents, etc. The latter could be applied to provide a certain

and content filtering can be used to enforce this. The virtual sandboxes

level of protection for the analysis server infrastructure, including the

should be isolated from each other and have no means of communicating

FoxReplay Analyst servers. The use of different vendors may be advised on

with any other system in the virtual sandbox infrastructure, just with the

different layers of the infrastructure. In case a virus is not detected by one

client that started them and the proxy to the FoxReplay Analyst infrastruc-

antivirus product, the other virus protection product may be able to

ture.

detect it.
Please note that if antivirus software is used, this may have an impact on

There are several ways of achieving this. In the network infrastructure,

performance on both the client and the server side. Furthermore, some

isolated or private VLANs could be defined to ensure hosts only are able to

content may be blocked resulting in failed or partial reconstruction of

communicate with the FoxReplay Analyst infrastructure and not with each

intercepted internet data. This is especially the case on the server side of

other. This measure relies on adequate configuration of (virtual) network

the infrastructure.

switches. Another solution is using a (secure) tunnel from a virtual sandbox to the FoxReplay Analyst environment, all communications is routed

Remote Desktop

over this tunnel to the proxy server. Unless any hostile code is able to

Using terminal server, Citrix or VMware-like solutions allows for concen-

change routing tables and/or the default gateway, this denies virtual sand-

tration of active data in a single assigned location. Centrally dedicated

boxes talking to each other and prevents spreading of malicious content.

servers process the active data as reconstructed by Fox ReplayAnalyst. The
active data is presented to the analysts through a remote desktop connection, exchanging only keyboard, video and mouse control data between the
servers and the client systems. The active data is passed as passive data to
the client workstations.
Using remote desktop provides good assurance that any infection by intercepted malicious code does not affect the client system used by the analyst.

Benefits of FoxReplay Analyst

Defence in depth
The best level of protection is achieved when the above security measures
are combined, creating a layered defence against malicious content. A buf-



Real-time & Streaming

fer zone or DMZ for performing the actual analysis in between the FoxRe-



Perfect reconstruction

play Analyst infrastructure and the classified network provides assurance



Communication in chronological order

hostile code is isolated and cannot spread any further. Antivirus software



Full-text search

is installed on both the analyst’s workstation and the virtual sandbox



Swift support for changed internet protocols / applications

environments. From the physical workstation in the classified network,



Support for custom internet protocols / applications

an analyst “remotely” starts and connects to an isolated virtual sandbox



As easy as using the internet

environment (DMZ) for analysis. This can be achieved by a physical KVM



See exactly what the target saw

connection or approved remote desktop software.



Simultaneous ‘side-by-side’ communications



Supports all natural languages



Client-side software

Limited functions are available to create for example PDF reports and
export them outside the virtual sandbox environment into the classified
network. Normal data diode and content filtering constructions for importing data into a classified network should be used.

Sample Deployment
Below is a sample deployment that includes the levels of workstation
protection discussed above. The workstations only send keyboard and
mouse commands to the virtual sandbox infrastructure and receive only
video updates back through e.g. a remote desktop protocol. By default, like
any other system in the network, the workstations have virus protection
software installed. The analyst uses a virtual sandbox to start Mozilla
Firefox and connect to the proxy server of the FoxReplay Analyst Infrastructure. Each virtual sandbox as well as the virtual sandbox infrastructure also runs virus protection and is isolated from the other sandboxes
through private VLANs and/or dedicated tunnels to the FoxReplay Analyst
environment. Antivirus software in the FoxReplay Analyst infrastructure
environment is optional and could be considered.
Virtual Sandbox
Infrastructure

Virtual
Sandbox

Workstation

Workstation

Classified network

Firewall
/ Diode

kvm

Virtual
Sandbox

Sandbox Network

In case a virus manifests itself in a virtual sandbox, first the virus protection software should trigger and eliminate the threat. If this fails, the
second layer of protection is that the virus is isolated to the specific virtual
sandbox and cannot spread to other sandboxes or most importantly, the
classified network.

FoxReplay Analyst Infrastructure

Proxy

Firewall

https

Viewer
Node
Viewer
Node

Fox-IT
Fox-IT is a leading IT security company with a strong international reputation. From our headquarters in the Netherlands and
our offices in Aruba and the UK, we deliver specialist security
and intelligence solutions for government bodies and other
major organizations worldwide. Our core business is developing
solutions for the protection of state secrets, conducting digital
forensics, audits, managed security services, consultancy and
training courses.

contact
Fox-IT
Olof Palmestraat 6
2616 LM Delft
The Netherlands
t
f
e

P.O Box 638
2600 AP Delft

+31 (0)15 284 79 99
+31 (0)15 284 79 90
replay-sales@fox-it.com

www.foxreplay.eu

Document Path: ["283-foxit-foxreplay-ws-protection.pdf"]

e-Highlighter

Click to send permalink to address bar, or right-click to copy permalink.

Un-highlight all Un-highlight selectionu Highlight selectionh